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[A]ABSTRACT 
 
In this article some historical and contemporary environmental conflicts are described. 
The international environmental liability of mining corporations is discussed. 
Comparisons are made with conflicts in the United States and in South Africa which 
fall under the rubric of the Environmental Justice movement. Such conflicts are fought 
out in many languages, and the economic valuation of damages is only one of such 
languages. Who has the power to impose particular languages of valuation? Who rules 
over the ways and means of simplifying complexity, deciding that some points of 
view are out of order? Who has power to determine which is the bottom-line in an 
environmental discussion? 
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[A]INTRODUCTION 
 
There is a new tide in global environmentalism that arises from social conflicts on 
environmental entitlements, on the burdens of pollution, on the sharing of uncertain 
environmental risks, on the loss of access to natural resources and environmental 
services. Many such ecological distribution conflicts, whether they take place inside 
or outside markets, whether they are local or global, come about because economic 
growth means an increased use of the environment. In such ecological distribution 
conflicts, the poor are often at the side of resource conservation and a clean 
environment even when they themselves do not claim to be environmentalists.  
 
The claims to environmental resources and services of others who are differentially 
empowered and endowed, can be contested by arguing inside a single standard of 
value or across plural values. In this article, valuation of damages is discussed and 
also international environmental liability. The relations between ecological 
distribution conflicts and economic valuation are as follows. First, the pattern of 
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prices in the economy will depend on the concrete outcomes to ecological distribution 
conflicts. Second, ecological distribution conflicts (which often arise outside the 
market) are not fought only through demands for monetary compensation established 
in actual or fictitious market places. They may be fought out in other arenas. When the 
study of an ecological distribution conflict reveals a clash of incommensurable values, 
then this helps to develop an Ecological Economics which moves beyond the 
obsession of “taking nature into account” in money terms, and which is able therefore 
to cope with value pluralism. 
 
[A]ENVIRONMENTALISM AVANT-LA-LETTRE: COPPER MINING IN 
JAPAN 
 
I have chosen copper mining as a starting point, for two reasons. First, it provides 
historical examples. By looking at historical cases of environmental conflict which 
were not yet represented in the language of environmentalism, we can then interpret 
as environmental conflicts, instances of social conflict today where the actors are still 
reluctant to call themselves environmentalists (Guha, 1989). Second, by comparing 
historical with contemporary conflicts on copper mining, I make the point that copper 
has not become obsolete (despite aluminum and optic fiber). On the contrary, the 
frontier for the extraction of copper reaches new territories, and this is a good point to 
make against the believers in the “dematerialization” of the New Economy. 
 
Environmentalists in Japan remember Ashio as the site of Japan’s first major 
industrial pollution disaster. This was a large copper mine not far from Tokyo owned 
by the Fukurawa corporation, which witnessed a major workers’ riot against working 
conditions in 1907. Japanese social historians have debated whether the riot was 
“spontaneous” or organized by ancient brotherhoods. There were also already some 
“direct action” socialists in Japan at the time. While, as we shall see, in Rio Tinto in 
Andalusia in 1888 there was a common front between miners and peasants against 
pollution, this does not seem to have been so at Ashio, where tens of thousands of 
peasants along the Watarase river fought during decades against pollution from heavy 
metals which damaged not only crops but also human health. They also fought against 
the building of a large sediment basin to store the polluted waters, which implied the 
destruction of the village of Yanaka in 1907 including its cemetery and sacred shrines. 
“The mine’s refinery belched clouds containing sulfuric acid that withered the 
surrounding forests, and the waste water ... ran off into the Watarase River, reducing 
rice yields of the farmers who irrigated fields with this water... Thousands of farming 
families... protested many times. They petitioned the national authorities and clashed 
with the police. Eventually their leader, Tanaka Shozo, created a great stir by directly 
petitioning the emperor for relief...As environmental destruction reemerged in the 
1960s as a major social issue, and popular concern with the impact of pollution 
intensified, so Ashio’s legacy as “the birthplace of pollution in Japan” has endured... 
At that time copper played a major role in the Japanese economy, ranking second to 
silk among Japan’s exports” (Nimura, 1997: 20-21, also Strong, 1977). Ashio was not 
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unique in the world, and Fukurawa’s own publicity remarked that Butte in Montana 
was a fearful place to live: “The smelting process has utterly destroyed the beauty of 
the landscape, evil gaseous smoke has killed all plant-life for miles round about; the 
streams are putrid with effluent, and the town itself seems buried under monstrous 
heaps of slag” (Strong, 1977: 67). Such were then the realities of copper mining in 
America. Ashio in comparison was not so bad except that, unlike Montana, there were 
thousands of unhappy peasants downstream.1 
 
Fukurawa had bought the Ashio mines in 1877. In 1888 he made a deal for the supply 
to a French syndicate of 19,000 tons of copper over two and a half years, the target 
was met in full, three thousand miners were working then at Ashio, their number was 
to increase later to fifteen thousand. The contract with Fukurawa was signed on behalf 
of the French syndicate by the manager of Jardine Matheson, a firm founded by Sir 
James Matheson of the Lews, who was an uncle of Hugh Matheson, the founder of the 
Rio Tinto company (Strong, 1977: 67). Fukurawa procastinated for decades on anti-
pollution measures, profiting from the novelty and uncertainty of the chemical 
pollution in question, and from the closeness between government and business in 
Japan. 
 
In cost-benefit language, it was argued: “Suppose for the sake of the argument that 
copper effluent were responsible for the damage to farmlands on either side of the 
Watarase - the public benefits that accrue to the country from the Ashio mine far 
outweigh any losses suffered in the affected areas. The damage can in any case be 
adequately taken care of by compensation” (article in the Tokio Nichi Nichi Shinbun 
of 10 Febr. 1892, in Strong, 1977: 74). In today’s parlance, a Pareto improvement 
means, in the strict sense, that a change such as a new mining project improves 
somebody’s situation, and does not worsen anybody’s situation. In this sense, Ashio 
did not fulfil the criterion. However, a Pareto improvement in a wider sense allows for 
compensation under the so-called Kaldor-Hicks rule, so that those better off can 
(potentially) compensate those worse off, and still a net gain be achieved. This was 
Fukurawa’s claim. Tanaka Shozo (1841-1913), the son of a peasant headman of a 
village in the polluted area, the leader of the anti-pollution struggles, could not yet 
have known about cost-benefit analysis and welfare economics. He became in the 
1890s a member of the Diet in Tokyo famous for this fervent speeches, he was a man 
with deep religious feelings, the retrospective father figure of Japanese 
environmentalism - born therefore more in a tradition of pro-peasant environmental 
justice (and also of care for the urban ecology and concern for forest protection and 
the water cycle, Tamanoi et al. 1994) than wilderness preservation, although within a 
national context of industrialism and militarism which put environmentalism on the 
defensive. Today Japan is of course a big importer of copper through active 
transnational companies like Mitsubishi. Pollution from copper mining and smelting 
play still a big role in the ecological economies of some exporting countries. If world 
copper extraction was in 1900 of the order of 400,000 tons per year, one hundred 
years later it is of the order of 10 million tons, an increase by a factor of 25 (compared 
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to a fourfold increase in the human population, from 1.5 to 6 billion people between 
1900 and 2000). Over 60 percent of copper production comes from such new mined 
ores, the rest from recycling, hence the relentless expansion of the copper frontier. 
The cheaper the cost of fresh extraction, the less recycling there is. 
 
Ashio was certainly not the only case of Japanese early popular environmentalism. 
Thus, when “the Nikko company built its copper refinery on the tip of the Saganoseki 
peninsula (in Oita Prefecture) in 1917, local farmers objected strenuosly. They feared 
that the acrid smoke from the refinery would blight the mountains and ruin the 
mulberry trees, on which their silk industry depended. Ignoring them the town 
officials agreed to the refinery. The farmers felt betrayed. The angry farmers swarmed 
into town and cut through the village leader’s house pillars, a tactic (uchikowashi) 
drawn straight from the Tokugawa period... The police brutally suppressed this 
protest, beating and arresting 100 participants. Nikko built the mill, and it operates to 
this day” (Broadbent, 1998: 138). 
 
[A]ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF POLLUTION IN PERU 
 
The Environmentalism of the Poor, and the Environmental Justice movement, are 
global cross-cultural movements, in all countries including the United States. (Guha, 
2000). Work by several authors in the Central Sierra of Peru 25 years ago explained 
the successful defense of the communities both against expanding haciendas (Mallon, 
1983). Indian shepherds’ and peasants’ resisted the “modernization” of the haciendas. 
Modern hacienda owners wanted to throw them out, and also their non-pedigreed 
sheep. The communities also had to struggle on another related front, against mining 
companies, and they still do. The Cerro de Pasco Copper Corporation polluted pasture 
lands in the 1920s and 1930s. Mines were not new to the Peruvian highlands. 
Huancavelica had supplied mercury to Potosi already in the 16th century. Silver had 
been mined in colonial and postcolonial times. Towards 1900, there was a world 
boom in copper, lead and zinc mining because of the proliferation of electrical 
instruments, tools, machines, armaments, railroads. Domestic capitalist miners were 
making small fortunes. In 1901 the Peruvian government changed the mining code, 
allowing private property of mining deposits (instead of state property and a regime of 
administrative concessions) (Dore, 2000:13-15). The Cerro de Pasco Corporation, 
from New York, bought many of the deposits, and started a large scale underground 
mining operation. The Cerro de Pasco company built roads, railroads, dams, 
hydroelectric plants, mining camps, at 4000 m. above sea level. It first built several 
small smelters, and then in 1922 a big smelter and refinery at La Oroya,  the effects of 
which became a cause celebre. “The new smelter polluted the region’s air, soil and 
rivers with arsenic, sulphuric acid and iron-zinc residues” (Dore, 2000:14). The 
pastures withered, people became ill. There was a legal case brought against the 
company by peasant communities, and by old and new hacienda owners (some of 
whom were already at the time trying to modernize sheep raising), up to 120 km 
away. The mining company was forced by the court to buy the lands it had polluted, 
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as a form of indemnity. When in later years the mining operations and La Oroya 
smelter became less pollutant (at least with respect to the air, because of the scrubbers, 
if not with respect to the rivers), the property of all this land became a valuable asset 
for the company, which then started a large sheep ranching business, getting into 
border conflicts with surrounding communities. The enormous ranch (of about 
300,000 ha) was expropriated in 1970 by the Land Reform, but still exists as the SAIS 
Tupac Amaru, owned by surrounding communities, one of the few large-scale sheep 
ranches in Peru which has not been taken over and split up into individual peasant 
communities. In the early 1900s, the Cerro de Pasco Corporation initially had 
difficulties in recruiting skilled labor. It resorted the enganche, a form of debt 
peonage. As Elizabeth Dore points out (Dore, 2000: 15), the large scale pollution 
caused by La Oroya smelter contributed to solving the labor shortage, because 
agricultural yields decreased in the small plots where agriculture is practiced at such 
altitude, and animals died. Peasant labor became available. This was another blessing 
in disguise. 
 
Mining in Peru was long dominated by the Cerro de Pasco Copper Corporation, but in 
the 1950s and 1960s, and increasingly until today, the main extraction of copper 
moved southward, towards Cuajone and Toquepala. These are large open-pit mines 
near Ilo, an extension of the rich deposits of Chuquicamata and other mines in 
northern Chile. The Southern Peru Copper Corporation owned by Asarco and 
Newmont Gold has subjected the city of Ilo, in southern Peru, of 60,000 inhabitants in 
the late 1990s, to water and air pollution for thirty years. The smelter was built in 
1969, 15 km north of Ilo, it spewed daily almost two thousand tons of sulfur dioxide, 
while tailings and slag were discharged without treatment on land, and also on the 
ocean where, it was claimed, “several kilometres of coastline are totally black” 
(Ivonne Yanez, in the ELAN website, 4 October 1996). The actors are this time 
speaking on both sides an explicitly environmental language (Diaz Palacios, 1988, 
Balvin 1995). The Southern Peru Copper Corporation is Peru’s major single exporter. 
The conflict is more urban than it was in the central Sierra, and two appeals to 
international courts have been made. The local authorities presented a successful 
complaint in 1992 to the (unofficial) International Water Tribunal in the Netherlands 
in 1992, obtaining its moral support. A class-action suit was initiated at the District 
Court for the Southern District of Texas, Corpus Christi Division, in September 1995 
but is was dismissed after the Peruvian state typically asked for the case to be brought 
back to Peru. The plaintiffs, on behalf of people from Ilo, most of them children with 
respiratory illnesses, complained that the pollution from sulfur dioxide had not 
appreciably decreased in the last years, despite the construction of a sulfuric acid plant 
(which recuperates sulfur dioxide). The federal court judge decided on 22 January 
1996 against admitting the case into the U.S. judicial system on grounds of forum non 
conveniens. 
 
[A]THE STORY OF RIO TINTO AND OTHER STORIES 
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It was in Huelva, in the southern Spanish region of Andalusia in the 1880s, years 
before the words environment and ecology became common social coinage, that the 
first big environmental conflict associated with the name of Rio Tinto took place  
(Amery, 1974, Ferrero, 1994). The old royal mines of Rio Tinto were bought in 1873 
by British and German interests, under Hugh Matheson, first chairman of the Rio 
Tinto Company. A new railway to the harbor of Huelva was immediately built, which 
was kindly made also available to local passengers on week-days (not on local 
holidays or Queen Victoria’s birthday). A very large open-pit mining operation was 
launched. Eighty years later, in 1954, the mines were sold back to new Spanish 
owners, the original Rio Tinto company  keeping one-third interest. This British 
company Rio Tinto (renamed Rio Tinto Zinc) went on to become a worldwide mining 
and polluting giant (Moody, 1992) - its name, its business origins, its archive in 
London, all point to Andalusia, where a massacre by the Army on the 4th February 
1888 of local farmers and peasants, and syndicalist miners, was the culmination of 
years of protests against sulfur dioxide pollution. Historians still debate the number of 
deaths caused when the Pavia Regiment opened fire against a large demonstration in 
the plaza of the village of  Rio Tinto: “The company could not find out, and in any 
case soon decided it was better to play down the seriousness of the whole affair and 
gave up its attempts to discover the number of casualties, though Rio Tinto tradition 
puts the total number of dead at between one and two hundred” (Amery, 1974:207, 
also Ferrero, 1993: 83 ff.) . Historians also debate whether the miners complained 
only against the fact that excessive pollution prevented them from working on some 
days (days of manta, i.e. blanket)  and therefore from earning full wages on those 
days, or whether they complained against pollution per se because of damage to their 
own and their families’ health. The company was taking out a large quantity of copper 
pyrites, employing some ten thousand miners. The idea was to sell the copper for 
export, and also as a by-product the sulfur in the pyrites (used for manufacturing 
fertilizers). The amount of ore extracted was so large, that in order to obtain the 
copper quickly, a lot of the sulfur was not recuperated but was thrown into the air as 
sulfur dioxide when roasting the ore in teleras in a process of open-air calcination, 
previous to smelting the concentrate. “The sulphurous fumes from the calcining 
grounds were a major cause of discontent. They produced an environment that 
everyone resented, for the pall of smoke which frequently hung over the area 
destroyed much of the vegetation and produced constant gloom and dirt” (Amery, 
1974:192). Large and small farmers, though the company was paying monetary 
compensation to them, managed to convince some of the councils from small 
surroundings villages to forbid open-air calcination in their own municipal territories. 
The company successfully intrigued (through members of the Spanish Parliament in 
its pay) to segregate Rio Tinto as a municipal territory of its own (being part of the 
territory of Zalamea, a larger town), on the reasonable argument that population in the 
mining area had increased very much. The company was keen to have local municipal 
officers favorable to her. On the 4th February 1888, the immediate causes for the 
strike had been the complaint against the non-payment of full wages in manta days, 
and the demand for the abolition of piece-work and for the end of the deduction of one 
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peseta weekly from the wage bill to cover expenses of the medical fund. Maximiliano 
Tornet, the miners’ syndicalist leader,  an anarchist who had been deported from Cuba 
back to Spain some years earlier, had managed to make an alliance with the peasants 
and farmers (and some landowners and local politicians) who had constituted the 
Huelva Anti-Smoke League. When the Army arrived in the plaza full of striking 
miners and peasants and peasant families from the region damaged by sulfur dioxide, 
an argument was going on inside the Rio Tinto town-hall on whether open-air teleras 
should be prohibited by municipal decree not only in surrounding villages but also in 
Rio Tinto itself. In terms of today’s language of environmental management, the local 
stakeholders (syndicalists, local politicians, peasants and farmers) did not achieve 
successful conflict resolution, let alone problem resolution. Had the municipality 
publicly announced a decree against open-air calcination, the tension in the plaza 
would have diminished, the strike would have been called off. Other stakeholders, that 
is, the Rio Tinto company and the civil governor in the capital of the province, were in 
the meantime mobilizing other resources, namely, arranging for troops to be brought 
into action. It is not known for sure who first shouted “fire”, perhaps a civilian from a 
window (Amery, 1974:205), but the soldiers understood the shout as an order to start 
shooting into the crowd.2  
 
The popular interpretation of this episode in terms of environmentalism became 
unexpectedly relevant one hundred years later, as the village of Nerva, exactly in this 
region, struggled in the 1990s against the regional authorities over the siting of a large 
hazardous waste dump (precisely in a disused mine), local environmentalists and 
village officials explicitly appealing to the living memory of that “year of shots” of 
1888 (Garcia Rey, 1997), fifty years before the Civil War of 1936-39, when the 
miners of Rio Tinto were massacred again, this time for non-ecological reasons. 
Meanwhile, sceptics on the thesis of popular environmentalism point out that, in 1888, 
the workers were more worried about wages that about pollution, and that the peasants 
and farmers were manipulated by local politicians who wanted to make money from 
the Rio Tinto company or who had their own  disagreements with other politicians at 
national level on the treatment given to the British company - so conspicuously British 
that it sported an Anglican church and a cricket team.3  
 
“Retrospective” environmentalism related to mining and air pollution is becoming a 
staple of social history in many countries. Not only air pollution, also water pollution 
(as in the Watarase river in Japan, and in Ilo, Peru) is important. It is present in other 
types of mining, for instance pollution by mercury, the azogue which the Spaniards 
employed in Potosi and also in Mexico to amalgamate with silver, and which today is 
used in Amazonian rivers to amalgamate with gold. Mercury was the origin of famous  
diseases in Japan from the 1950s onwards (though the consumption of fish), the best-
known non-radioactive pollution episodes in  the post-1945 history of Japan.  
 
Extraction of copper has been increasing at about 1.5 per cent per year still in the 
1990s. If prices go down it is because of oversupply and not because of lack of 
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demand. I had planned already to include the following contemporary conflict, which 
now looks to me even more significant. In the late 1990s, in the region of Intag 
(Cotocachi, province of Imbabura) in northern Ecuador, Mitsubishi was defeated by a 
local non-governmental organization, Decoin, with help from Ecuadorian and 
international groups, in its plans to start mining for copper. I know this case first-hand, 
because of my relation with Accion Ecologica (Quito) which helped Decoin. The idea 
was to relocate one hundred families to make way for open-cast mining, bringing in 
thousand of miners in order to extract a large reserve of copper. This is a beautiful and 
fragile area of cloud forest and agriculture, with a mestizo population. Rio Tinto had 
already shown interest, but its previous incursions in Ecuador (at Salinas in Bolivar, at 
Molleturo in Azuay) ended in retreats. A Mitsubishi subsidiary, Bishi Metals, started 
in the early 1990s some preliminary work in Intag. After many meetings with the 
authorities, on May 12, 1997, a large gathering of members of affected communities 
resorted to direct action. Most of the company’s goods were inventoried and removed 
from the area (and later given back to the company), and the remaining equipment 
was burnt with no damage to persons. The government of Ecuador reacted by bringing 
a court case for terrorism (a rare event in Ecuador) against two community leaders and 
the leader of Decoin but the case was dismissed by the courts one year later. Attempts 
to bring in Codelco to mine  (the Chilean national copper company) were also 
defeated, when Accion Ecologica from Quito sent one activist, Ivonne Ramos, to 
downtown Santiago to demonstrate with support from Chilean environmentalists on 
the occasion of a state visit of the president of Ecuador, and she was arrested. The 
publicity convinced Codelco to withdraw. Accion Ecologica also organized a visit by 
women belonging to the Intag communities, to copper mining areas in Peru, like Cerro 
de Pasco, La Oroya and Ilo. The women did their own interviews in those areas, and 
came back to Intag with their own impressions, carrying sad miners’ music and lyrics 
which became an immediate hit in Intag. These triumphant local women still deny to 
this day that they are environmentalists, or, God forbid, ecofeminists.4  Today there 
are several initiatives for alternative forms of development in Intag, one of them being 
the export of “organic” coffee to Japan arranged through environmental networks first 
contacted in the fight against Mitsubishi. But the copper ore is still there, 
underground, and the world demand for copper (despite calls for the 
“dematerialization” of the economy) keeps increasing. 
 
[A]BOUGAINVILLE AND WEST PAPUA 
 
Copper mining is more successful elsewhere, though not without conflicts. In the 
island of Bougainville, the Rio Tinto Zinc company got into trouble because of local 
opposition despite the agreement the company had made with the government of 
Papua New Guinea, which has sovereignty over Bougainville, in order to exploit the 
site of what was described as the most profitable copper and gold mine in the world. 
Back in 1974, it was reported that “the natives of Bougainville have stopped throwing 
geologists into the sea even since the company [Rio Tinto Zinc] declared itself willing 
to compensate them for the land it had taken with cash and other material services”. 
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However, it was also reported that monetary compensation was not enough: “The 
village communities affected gave the highest importance to land as the source of their 
material standard of life. Land was also the basis of their feelings of security, and the 
focus of most of their religious attention. Despite continuing compensation payments 
and rental fees, local resentment over the taking of the land remains high, and there is 
strong opposition to any expansion of mining in Bougainville, whether by the existing 
company, the government, or anyone else” (Mezger,1980:195). Finally, the tiny island 
of 160,000 inhabitant erupted into a secessionist war at the end of the 1980s. We 
notice here the use of languages such as sacredness, and national independence. We 
notice also that the language of monetary compensation was brought into play. 
 
Not far from Bougainville, the copper extraction frontier reached West Papua under 
Indonesia’s sovereignty, thirty years ago at a copper and gold mine called Grasberg 
owned by Freeport McMoRan from New Orleans, a company run by a colorful CEO, 
Jim Bob Moffet.5  Rio Tinto has a participation in this mine. The plans are in 2000 to 
mine daily 300,000 tons of ore, of which 98 per cent would be dumped into the rivers 
as tailings. The “ecological rucksack” of this operation includes of course not only the 
discarded tailings but also the overburden, that is all the materials removed before 
reaching the ore. The total copper content to be finally recovered would be nearly 30 
million tons of copper, three years of world production, which would come into the 
market at a rate which would make of Grasberg the supplier of nearly ten per cent of 
world copper every year. This open cast mine is at high altitude, next to a glacier. The 
deposit originally formed the core of a 4,100 m. mountain, and the bottom of the open 
pit now lies at the 3,100 m. level. The current expansion would mean an annual 
extraction of ore that would allow an annual output of 900,000 tons of copper, and of 
2.75 million ounces of gold.6 Water pollution in the Ajkwa river has been up to now 
the major environmental complaint, and acid drainage will be an increasing problem. 
The ecology of the island is particularly sensitive, and the scale of operations is 
enormous. In 1977, at the initial stages of operation, some Amungme rebelled, and 
destroyed the slurry pipeline carrying copper concentrate to the coast. Reprisals by the 
Indonesian army were terrible. Many complaints against Freeport McMoRan led to an 
initially unsuccessful class-action suit in New Orleans in April 1996 by Tom Beanal 
and other members of the Amungme tribe. Tom Beanal declared (at a speech at 
Loyola University, New Orleans, 23 May 1996): “These companies have taken over 
and occupied our land...Even the sacred mountains we think of as our mother have 
been arbitrarily torn up, and they have not felt the least bit guilty... Our environment 
has been ruined, and out forests and rivers polluted by waste... We have not been 
silent. We protest and are angry. But we have been arrested, beaten and put into 
containers: we have been tortured and even killed”. Tom Beanal was reported to have 
gotten some money from the company for his own NGO, an attempt at a classic 
procedure for conflict resolution, but the legal case made some progress in the 
Louisiana courts in March 1998 on the issue of whether U.S. courts could have 
jurisdiction. The best-known representative of the Amungme is now Yosepha 
Alomang, subjected to detention in horrible conditions in 1994, and who was 
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prevented from leaving the country in 1998 when she wanted to attend a Rio Tinto’s 
shareholders’ meeting in London.7 
 
Some Freeport’s shareholders have been publicly concerned about the liabilities 
incurred by the company in Indonesia. Henry Kissinger is a director of Freeport. The 
company was deeply involved with the Suharto regime, having given shares in the 
company to relatives and associates of the ex- President. Freeport is also the biggest 
source of tax revenue for Indonesia. Which line will the new Indonesian government, 
and also the separatist movement in West Papua (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM), 
take towards plans by Freeport (and Rio Tinto) to expand the extraction of copper and 
gold ore? The OPM has staged ceremonies raising the Papuan flag in the last thirty 
years, answered violently by the Indonesia Army and by Freeport’s security forces 
(one famous instance took place on Christmas Day of 1994 at Tembagapura, a locality 
near the Grasberg mine). Will claims for an ecological debt to be paid by Freeport 
McMoRan be made not through a private class-action suit brought by indigenous 
tribes but as a result of an Indonesian governmental action, an international replica of 
a Superfund case in the United States? Attempts to obtain indemnities for 
international externalities caused by TNCs outside their legal country of residence are 
interesting ingredients in the calculation of the many environmental liabilities which 
the North owes to the South, the sum of which would amount to a large ecological 
debt.  
 
The Indonesian state had an authoritarian regime (or less politely, it was a capitalist 
dictatorship) from the mid-1960s until the end of the 1990s. The circumstances in 
West Papua (or Irian Jaya, this being at the time the official Indonesian name) with 
both a very rich mine and a separatist movement, provided reasons for a heavy 
military presence. It would be a cruel joke to say that a suitable environmental policy 
(implementing the “polluter pays principle”) would have allowed externalities to be 
internalized into the price of exported copper and gold. Environmental economists 
forget to include the distribution of political power in their analysis. Some of them 
even believe in their touching innocence that environmental damages arise because of 
“missing markets”. In fact, externalities should be seen in general not as “market 
failures” but as “cost-shifting successes” (Martinez-Alier and O’Connor, 1996, 1999). 
The language of indigenous territorial rights (whose official acceptance would be a 
novelty in Indonesia), and even the stronger language of a separate national Papuan 
identity (which is historically relevant, since West Papua was annexed by Indonesia 
after the departure of the Dutch), may be used nowadays after the end of the 
dictatorship in order to fight the human and environmental disaster caused by the 
world’s largest gold mine and the third-largest copper mine. 
 
Freeport McMoRan is building in 2000 with Mitsubishi a large smelter at Gresik in 
Java, for export of copper to Japan. Freeport McMoRan also happens to own in 
Huelva, Spain, the firm Atlantic Copper which is the successor of the copper smelting 
and refining operation of the Spanish Rio Tinto company formed after 1954, and 
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where copper concentrate from Grasberg is taken. It is all as a large family.  
 
In international purely political conflicts without real substance, such as a dispute 
between states over a strip of useless territory, by reaching a peace agreement and 
drawing a new frontier, both the conflict and the problem disappear. Sometimes, as in 
the last twenty years for the threat by CFC to the ozone layer, or for transboundary 
sulfur dioxide emissions in Europe, agreements are reached which lead to regimes that 
solve both the conflict and the problem. Instead, in many other environmental cases, 
solving the conflict is not equivalent to solving the problem. In order to advance 
towards problem-resolution, what is then needed is not conflict-resolution, but 
conflict-exacerbation. 
 
[A]A FEW GOLD MINING CONFLICTS 
 
Gold is sometimes produced together with other metals, such as copper, but is often 
the primary objective in mining enterprise. Gold mining is similar in a sense to shrimp 
farming, or to the extraction of tropical wood like mahogany. Its demand is directly 
driven by consumption. About 80 per cent of all gold that is dug out of the ground 
ends up as jewelry. Now, however, is consumption the real driver of the economy? 
Are not changes of techniques the real drivers of capitalism, and are they not 
introduced in production, rather than consumption, because of the pressures of 
competition and profits? Moreover, could not enough consumption to maintain 
production levels be secured already by the incomes gained in relatively 
dematerialized activities - a Seattle economy without Boeing? Interesting but 
premature questions, because the economy is not dematerializing and because 
consumption has a life of its own, it is not determined by the necessity to sell 
production. The economy is driven by the profit-rate. It also driven by conspicuous 
consumption or the wish to obtain positional goods. Hence the use of increased 
incomes in order to buy more and more gold, a habit of the human species in which 
the East and the West truly meet.  
 
The price of gold makes it still profitable to open new mines. Gold lasts a very long 
time but the existing stock of gold in the world, counting also the central banks’ 
reserves, does not seem to satisfy humankind’s desires, and there is pressure to open 
new mines not to substitute for gold which is lost but to accumulate new stocks. Why 
do not the central banks sell the gold they have? Some religions forbid consumption 
of shrimps or pork or beef or other types of food. Is there any religion that forbids the 
mining and accumulation of gold? Gold mining is particularly destructive, both when 
it is small-scale (as the garimpeiros in Brazil) and when it is large-scale by 
corporations such as Placer Dome, Newmont, or Freeport or Rio Tinto or Anglo-
American. Gold leaves behind enormous “ecological rucksacks”, and also pollution 
from mercury or cyanide. 
 
The participants at a Peoples’ Gold Summit in San Juan Ridge, California, which was 
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held on June 2-8, 1999, asked for a moratorium on the exploration for gold. The 
manifesto coming out of this meeting begins: “Life, land, clean water and clean air are 
more precious than gold. All people depend on nature for life. The right to life is a 
guaranteed human right. It is, therefore, our responsibility to protect all of nature for 
present and future generations. Large-scale gold mining violently uproots and destroys 
the spiritual, cultural, political, social and economic lives of peoples as well as entire 
ecosystems. Historic and current destruction created by gold mining is greater than 
any value generated.8 Commercial gold mining projects are mainly on indigenous 
lands. By violating their land rights mining companies are denying the right to life of 
those indigenous peoples, whose relationship to land is central to their spiritual 
identity and survival. We need to support the self-determination of indigenous peoples 
and the recovery, demarcation and legal recognition of campesinos, tribal and 
indigenous peoples’ lands... Large-scale and small-scale, toxic chemical-dependent 
gold mining damages landscapes, habitats, biodiversity, human health and water 
resources. Water especially is contaminated by cyanide, acid mine drainage, heavy 
metals and mercury from gold mining. Additionally, the hydrological cycle is changed 
and water sources are grossly depleted by pumping water from aquifers”. There is no 
space here to describe in detail the conflict in Peru, at the time of writing, between the 
Yanacocha mine in Cajamarca (where Atahualpa met Pizarro) and local communities 
that belong to the Federacion de Rondas Campesinas. The gold mine is owned by 
Newmont, and also by a local company, with a 5% share belonging to the 
International Finance Corporation of the World Bank. In Venezuela, under the 
government that preceded President Hugo Chavez, Decree 1850 of 1997 tried to open 
up the forest reserve area of Imataca of three million ha to gold mining. A movement 
arose which comprised the sparse local indigenous Pemon population, some 
environmental groups such as Amigransa (the friends of the Gran Sabana), some 
anthropologists and sociologists, and some members of Parliament. They all used 
different languages (from Indian demonstrations in the streets of Caracas to legal 
appeals to the Supreme Court) in the service of the same cause. They managed for the 
time being to stop mining in Imataca. The environmental commission of the Chamber 
of Deputies of Venezuela appealed to the Supreme Court against Decree 1850, 
quoting a figure between US$ 7 thousand and 23 thousand per hectare for the 
restoration of the vegetable cover affected by oil exploitation, a useful if moderate 
figure in order to calculate the large environmental liabilities that gold mining, with its 
toxic effects and large ecological rucksacks, implies.9 
 
[A]ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
 
“Environmental Justice” is not an expression taken, as one would expect, from 
philosophy or ethics but from environmental sociology and from the study of race 
relations. In the United States it has come to mean since the late 1980s and early 
1990s an organized movement against “environmental racism, i.e. the 
disproportionate allocation of toxic waste to Latino or African-American 
communities. It is also relevant for Indian reservations in the United States, 
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particularly in the context of uranium mining and nuclear waste. Indeed, 
“environmental justice” could subsume historic conflicts on sulfur dioxide, the Chipko 
and Chico Mendes cases, the current conflicts on the use of carbon sinks, the conflicts 
on oustees from dams, the fight for the preservation of rainforests or mangroves for 
livelihood, and many other cases around the world which sometimes have to do with 
“racism” and sometimes not.  
 
The Environmental Justice movement in the United States (Bullard, 1990,1993, 
Pulido, 1991, 1996, Bryant and Mohai, 1992, Bryant, 1995, Sachs, 1995, Gottlieb, 
1993, Szasz, 1994, Schwab, 1994, Westra and Wenz, 1995, Dorsey, 1997, Faber, 
1998, DiChiro, 1998, Camacho, 1998, Taylor, 2000) is quite different from the two 
previous environmentalisms in this country, namely, the efficient and sustainable use 
of natural resources (in the tradition of Gifford Pinchot), and the cult of wilderness (in 
the tradition of John Muir). As a self-conscious movement, Environmental Justice 
fights against the alleged disproportionate dumping of toxic waste or exposure to 
different sorts of environmental risk in areas of predominantly African-American, or 
Hispanic or Native-American populations. The language employed is not that of 
uncompensated externalities but rather the language of race discrimination, which is 
politically powerful in the United States because of the long Civil Rights struggle. In 
fact, the organized Environmental Justice movement is not an outgrowth of previous 
currents of environmentalism but rather an outgrowth of the Civil Rights movement. 
Thus, in the Third World, the main socio-environmental question was in the 1980s 
whether an indigenous, independent Environmentalism of the Poor existed, a question 
first theorized in India and, later, in Latin America and Africa, because of episodes of 
defense of common property resources against the State or the Market (Martinez-Alier 
and Guha, 1997, 1999). Meanwhile, in the United States the question was whether the 
buoyant mainstream environmental movement would deign to consider the existence 
of  “environmental racism”, whether it could accept and work with “minorities” which 
were mainly concerned with urban pollution.  
 
There are many cases of local environmental activism in the United States by “citizen-
workers groups” (Gould et al., 1996) outside the organized Environmental Justice 
movement, some with one-hundred years’ roots in the many struggles for health and 
safety in mines and factories, perhaps also in complaints against pesticides in 
Southern cotton fields, and certainly in the struggle against toxic waste at Love Canal 
in upstate New York led by Lois Gibbs (Gibbs, 1981, 1995) who also later led a 
nation-wide “toxics-struggles” movement showing that poor communities would not 
tolerate any longer being dumping grounds (Hofrichter, 1993). In the “official” 
Environmental Justice movement are included celebrated episodes of collective action 
against incinerators (because of the uncertain risk of dioxins), particularly in Los 
Angeles, led by women. Also in the 1980s, other environmental conflicts gave rise to 
groups such as People for Community Recovery in South Chicago (Altgeld Gardens), 
led by Hazel Johnson, and the West Harlem Environmental Action (WHEACT) in 
New York, led by Vernice Miller. In 1989, the South-West Network for Economic 
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and Environmental Justice (SNEEJ), led by Richard Moore, was founded, with its 
main seat in Albuquerque, New Mexico, out of grievances felt by Mexican and Native 
American populations. In October 1991 the First National People of Color 
Environmental Leadership Summit took place in Washington D.C., the Principles of 
Environmental Justice were proclaimed, and the movement for Environmental Justice 
became well known. President Clinton’s Executive Order 12,898 of 1994 on 
Environmental Justice was a triumph for this movement. It directed all federal 
agencies (though not corporations or private citizens) to act in such a way that 
disproportionate burdens of pollution do not fall on low income and minority 
populations in all territories and possessions of the United States. Thus, both poverty 
and race were taken into account, and nothing was said about impacts outside the 
United States. Happy the country where “low-income” people are regarded as a 
minority (alongside or overlapping with racial “minorities”)!  
 
The insistence on “environmental racism” is sometimes surprising to analysts from 
outside the United States. In fact, some foreign academics refuse to acknowledge the 
racial angle, and have boldly stated that: “If one were asked to date the beginning of 
the environmental justice movement in the United States, then 2 August 1978 might 
be the place to start. This was the day when the CBS and ABC news networks first 
carried news of the effect of toxic waste on the health of the people of a place called 
Love Canal” (Dobson, 1998:18). However, the Love Canal people, led by Lois Gibbs, 
were not people of color, they were white, as such categories are understood in the 
U.S., and therefore were subject only to metaphorical, not real “environmental 
racism”. Other non-U.S. academics agree with the interpretation that Environmental 
Justice is in the U.S. a movement against “environmental racism”. I also agree. Thus, 
the seminal moment (Low and Gleeson, 1998: 108) was in 1982 in Warren County, 
North Carolina. Of course, one could also argue that the world environmental justice 
movement started long ago at a hundred dates and places all over the world. For 
instance, in Andalusia in 1888, when miners and peasants at Rio Tinto were 
massacred by the army. Or when Tanaka Shozo threw himself in front of the 
Emperor’s carriage with a petition in his hand. Or, in the United States, not in North 
Carolina but in the struggles against mining corporations in Wisconsin conducted by 
alliances of Indian tribes and environmentalists in the 1970s and 1980s (Gedick, 
1993), and in many other struggles of resistance by Native Americans, from Canada to 
Tierra del Fuego. Which will be the worldwide First of May or Eighth of March of 
Environmental Justice and the Environmentalism of the Poor? Chico Mendes’ 
assassination day, Ken Saro-Wiwa’s, or perhaps the day the Rainbow Warrior was 
sunk by the French secret services in New Zealand, and its Portuguese cook died? Or 
when Karunamoi Sardar died defending her village in Horinkhola, Khulna, 
Bangladesh, on 7 November 1990?10 
 
The self-conscious Environmental Justice movement in the United States of the 1980s 
and 1990s shifted the whole discussion about environmentalism in the United States 
away from preservation and conservation of Nature towards social justice. It 
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destroyed also the NIMBY image of grassroots environmental protests by turning 
them into NIABY protests (not in anyone’s backyard). Also, it expanded the circle of 
people involved in environmental policy by practicing “post-normal science” in the 
“popular epidemiology” movement. In the United States, the legislation against 
racism (such as Title VI of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964) forbids 
discrimination based on race. However, in order to establish the existence of racism, it 
is not sufficient to prove that environmental impact is different (for instance, that lead 
in children’s blood level is different according to racial background). It must also be 
shown that there an explicit intention to cause harm to a minority group. The 
uncertainties of environmental risk (for instance, dioxin), and the statistical difficulties 
in separating racial and economic factors in toxic waste location decisions, have given 
rise to a rich practice of “popular epidemiology” (Novotny, 1998). It might be difficult 
to prove that race more than poverty correlates with toxic waste, but if this is 
convincingly shown, then the chances of redress are high. Lay persons gather 
scientific data and other information, and they also process the results offered by 
official experts in order to challenge them in cases involving toxic pollution, a clear 
case of “extended peer review”. 
 
By emphasizing  “racism”, the movement for Environmental Justice also emphasizes 
incommensurableness of values. This is its greatest achievement. If I pollute a poor 
neighborhood, by applying the polluter pays principle (PPP), I may compensate the 
damage. This is more easily written than done, because, how much is human health 
worth? In which scale of value? Nevertheless, the PPP implies that a worsening 
ecological distribution is in principle compensated by an improving economic 
distribution. The objective is of course to make pollution expensive enough so that its 
level will decrease by a change in technology or by a lower level of polluting 
production. Whatever the objective, the principle implies a single scale of value. Now, 
the same problem phrased in terms of “environmental racism” becomes a different 
problem. I can inflict damage to human dignity by using a racial insult or by racial 
discrimination. Paying a fine does not entitle me to repeat such conduct. There is no 
real compensation. Money and human dignity are not commensurate. 
 
Bullard, who is both an academic and an activist, realizes the potential of the 
Environmental Justice movement beyond “minority” populations, and asserted in 
1994: “Grassroots groups, after decades of struggle, have grown to become the core of 
the multi-issue, multi-racial, and multi-regional environmental justice movement. 
Diverse community-based groups have begun to organize and link their struggles to 
issues of civil and human rights, land rights and sovereignty, cultural survival, racial 
and social justice, and sustainable development... Whether in urban ghettos and 
barrios, rural “poverty pockets”, Native American reservations, or communities in the 
Third World, grassroots groups are demanding an end to unjust and non-sustainable 
environmental and development policies...”.11  Notice then the clear awareness that 
environmental justice is functional to sustainability, and that it concerns poor people 
everywhere, including  indeed Third World communities, that is, billions of people. 
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Low-income “people of color” are a minority in the U.S. but they are certainly a 
majority in the world at large. 
 
There are some ecological distribution conflicts in the world (the European conflicts 
on nuclear risks as expressed at famous fights in Gorleben or Creys-Malville, or again 
the European conflict against U.S. “hormone beef” and transgenic crops, or the 
current conflict on the Three Gorges dam in China, for instance), for the analysis and 
resolution of which, the metaphor of “environmental racism” is not useful. On the 
other hand, we could retrospectively apply “environmental racism” to one of the many 
forms of racism that the Spaniards showed in America, by imposing a terrible load of 
mercury poisoning to indigenous workers in silver mines (Dore, 1999). Environmental 
racism is often a useful language for conflicts which have been fought up to now 
under the banner of indigenous territorial rights. Activists and lawyers in the class 
action suit against Texaco from Ecuador, blamed Texaco in advertisements in U.S. 
newspapers in 1999 for “environmental racism”. Profiting from the publicity against 
Texaco because of a court case for internal racism against black employees in the 
United States (settled out of court in 1997 for US$ 176 million), sympathizers for the 
Ecuadorian plaintiffs placed an advertisement in the New York Times (23 Sept. 1999) 
which stated: “The lawsuit alleges that in Ecuador, Texaco dumped the poisonous 
water produced by oil drilling directly onto the ground, in nearby rivers, and in 
streams and ponds. The company knowingly destroyed the surrounding environment 
and endangered the lives of the indigenous people who had lived and fished there for 
years. These are people of color, people for whose health and well-being Texaco 
shows only a cavalier disregards... It’s time that Texaco learns that devaluing the lives 
and well-being of people because of the color of their skin is no longer acceptable for 
any American company”. Notice that this language, so effective in the United States, 
was not used when the case started in 1993, and it would be problematic though not 
impossible to apply it to Texaco’s successor, Petroecuador, which has used similar 
technology damaging not only indigenous people but also average mestizo Ecuadorian 
settlers. Perhaps “internal colonialism” (Adeola, 2000) could be used against 
Petroecuador, as against the Nigerian authorities, while “racism” could be reserved for 
Texaco (or Shell, in Nigeria). 
 
[A]INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES 
 
Environmental conflicts in South Africa are often phrased in the language of 
environmental justice (Bond, 2000). Thus, a conflict in the late 1990s which continues 
at the time of writing places environmentalists and local populations against a project 
near Port Elizabeth for the development of an industrial zone, a new harbor, and a 
smelter of zinc for export, owned by Billinton, a British firm which would guzzle up 
electricity and water at cheap rates while poor people cannot get the small amounts of 
water and electricity they desperately need, or in any case must pay increasing rates 
under current economic policies . The Billinton project has costs in terms of  tourists’ 
revenues because of the threats to a proposed national elephant park extension nearby, 
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to beaches, estuaries, islands and whales (Bond, 2000:47). There are also costs in 
terms of the displacement of people from the village of Coega. This point was 
emphasized in a letter sent by the Southern Africa Environment Project to Peter 
Mendelson, the British Secretary of State for Trade and Industry: “We are writing on 
behalf of those who have historically lacked the capacity to assert their rights and 
protect their own interests but who now seek to be heard and to call to the attention of 
the international community the injustice that is now about to be inflicted upon them”. 
The life of the people of Coega was already full of memories of displacements under 
the racist regime of apartheid. Although Billinton could no longer profit from the lack 
of voice of the people under apartheid, now  -it was alleged- it sought “to take 
advantage of the region’s desperate need for employment to enable construction of a 
highly polluting facility that would never be allowed adjacent to a major population 
centre in the U.K. or any other European country”.12  A small improvement in the 
economic situation of the people would be obtained at high social and environmental 
cost, because of displacement of people, and also because of increased levels of sulfur 
dioxide, heavy metals, dust, liquid effluents. An appeal was made to British Minister 
to take into account OECD’s guidelines for multinational enterprises which include a 
chapter on environmental protection since 1991, but which are no more than 
recommendations which the authorities cannot enforce directly. The Minister was 
asked in any case to exercise his influence upon Billinton informally. 
 
The environmental impacts which the apartheid regime left behind are now surfacing. 
There are large liabilities to be faced. Best known is the asbestos scandal, which 
includes international litigation initiated by victims of asbestosis against British 
companies, particularly Cape. Nearly 2000 persons asked for compensation because 
of personal damages as a result of Cape’s negligence in supervising, producing and 
distributing asbestos products. The lawyers argue that Cape was aware of the dangers 
of asbestos at least from 1931 onwards, when Britain asbestos regulations were 
introduced. Nevertheless production continued in South Africa with the same low 
safety standards until the late 1970s. Medical researchers have found that 80 per cent 
of Penge’s black miners (in Northern Province) who died between 1959 and 1964 had 
asbestosis. The average age of the victims was 43. Cape operated a mill for 34 years 
in Prieska, Northern Cape, where 13 per cent of workers’ deaths were attributed to 
mesothelioma, a very painful asbestos related cancer. Asbestos levels in this mill in 
1948 were almost 30 times the maximum UK limit. There are other cases in South 
Africa of asbestos contamination, by companies such as Msauli and GEFCO, at 
locations such as Mafefe, Pomfret, Barberton, Badplass (Felix, in Cock and Koch, 
1991). 
 
Contaminated abandoned mines and asbestos dumps must nowadays be rehabilitated 
by the post-apartheid South African governments. Simultaneously, court cases were 
started against Cape in the U.K., and the House of Lords (in its judicial capacity) ruled 
for a while  (until July 1999, when the judgement was reversed) that such cases could 
be heard in London rather than in South Africa. It seemed that British companies 
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could be sued in British courts. Against GATT-WTO doctrine, the asbestos court case 
and similar ones, if successful, would show that international regulation is required 
not only about the safety and quality of the final products but also on the process of 
production and its side-effects. When regulation failed or was non-existent, and when 
effective protest was impossible because of political repression, there are then 
retrospective liabilities to be faced. The courts will perhaps institute little by little a 
sort of international Superfund obligations for the transnational companies. True, the 
South African apartheid state was blind to damage to black workers. The asbestos and 
mining companies most probably fulfilled internal South African laws as regards 
safety, wages, and taxes. Nevertheless, they should be held accountable for the 
“externalities” that they left behind. Given the chance, workers and their families 
would have complained, not so much because they were environmentalists but 
because their health was threatened. The law firm which represents the asbestosis 
victims (Leigh, Day) also brought actions in London for damages to workers at Thor 
Chemicals in KwaZulu-Natal on behalf of victims of poisoning by mercury, and on 
behalf of cancer victims from Rio Tinto’s Rossing uranium mine in Namibia.13 
 
In April 1990 massive concentrations of mercury had been detected in the Umgeweni 
River near the Thor Chemicals’ Cato Ridge plant. This was reported in the national 
and international press. Thor Chemicals imported mercury waste into South Africa, 
partly supplied by Cyanamid, an American company. South African environmental 
groups, mainly Earthlife under Chris Albertyn’s leadership, allied themselves with the 
Chemical Workers Industrial Union, the local African residents under their chief, and 
also white farmers from the Tala Valley who had already endured a bad experience of 
pesticide spraying from the neighboring sugar industry. A true “rainbow” alliance, 
which also incorporated U.S. activists against the Cyanamid plant in question, 
complained against such “garbage imperialism” or “toxic colonialism” by asking: 
“Why did Thor, a British company, decide to build the world’s larget toxic mercury 
recycling plant on the borders of KwaZulu in a fairly remote part of South Africa? 
Why not build it closer to the sources of the waste mercury in the United States or in 
Europe?” (Crompton and Erwin, in Cock and Koch eds., 1991:82-84). 
 
Actually, “the practice of exporting hazardous wastes for disposal in developing 
countries has been described as environmental injustice or environmental racism on a 
global scale”. (Lipman, 1998). The Basel Convention of 1989 forbids the export of 
hazardous waste from rich countries except for recovery of raw materials or for 
recycling. It was complemented on 25 March 1994 by a full ban negotiated at a 
meeting in Geneva on all exports of hazardous waste from the 24 rich industrialized 
countries of the OECD. The agreement was reached over the opposition of the richest 
countries, which received from Greenpeace, in this context, the name of the Sinister 
Seven. Some defections inside the European Union (Denmark, and later Italy) helped 
an alliance among China, Eastern European countries, and in general all southern poor 
countries in order to close in theory the “recycling” loophole of the initial 1989 
convention though which ninety per cent of the waste was flowing. Thus, pending 
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ratification and domestic implementation of this agreement, and assuming also that 
Article 11 of the Basel Convention (which allows for bilateral or multilateral 
hazardous waste exporting agreements provided they comply with “environmentally 
sound management”) is not abused, then a sad chapter of industrialization would be 
closed. Rich countries would not be able to exploit the weaker regulations of poorer 
countries to avoid their own responsibility for minimizing waste. Clearly, the issue is 
far from over. The pressure for the export of toxic waste still increases, although the 
Basel Convention has had a positive effect. This is the context in which in November 
1998 it was announced that nearly 3,000 tons of Taiwanese toxic waste from the 
group Formosa Plastics had been dumped in a field in the port of Sihanoukville in 
Cambodia. Taiwan is not a party to the Basel Convention. The waste was scavenged 
by poor villagers, many of whom later complained of sickness; one died quickly. 
(Human Rights Watch, 1999). The logic of Lawrence Summers’ Principle still 
remains compelling.14  
 
The perception of risk changes with time, sometimes because scientific research 
produces clear results, sometimes because, on the contrary, scientific uncertainties 
cannot be dispelled, and a feeling of danger creeps in. Then, the question is asked: 
Who is responsible for cleaning up the (newly perceived) mess, or for paying 
indemnities or making reparations? How to assign environmental liabilities, granting 
that restoration may be impossible when irreversible damages or deaths are involved? 
Thus, the “Superfund” legislation in the United States is supposed to achieve the 
cleaning up of hazardous waste sites (chemical dumps, mine tailings...), which are 
called “orphaned” when no existing corporation or private citizen or public body is 
responsible. In this exceptional case, the burden of proof lies rather with polluting 
companies than with the polluted citizens or with the regulatory agency. Companies 
have to prove against EPA’ allegations that no risk of damage exists from the waste 
they have abandoned. Nuclear waste is excluded however from the Superfund 
legislation, which arose in the late 1970s (at the end of President Carter’s 
administration). Its official name is Comprehensive Environmental Response 
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). As in Europe after the Seveso alarm 
(dioxin release from a chemical firm near Milan), in the United States after the Love 
Canal scandal near Niagara Falls in upper state New York, there was a feeling that 
something should be done to remedy damage done, and to make future damage costly 
by imposing strict norms of private or public liability. Superfund may also be 
interpreted as a government response to the first stirrings of the environmental justice 
movement. Cleaning up operations under Superfund are financed by special charges 
on the oil and chemical industries, when the sites are “orphaned”. When the 
companies are identified and still active, they have to pay for the cleaning up. The 
EPA must not act in an “arbitrary and capricious” manner but it has no obligation to 
prove that there is actual damage, only that there is a risk of damage. Critics of 
Superfund point out that the costs are too high compared to benefits, including 
administrative costs, and that the communities near the waste sites cleaned up do not 
always benefit economically because the improved environmental situation is 
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countered by the adverse environmental image. 
 
Notice that there is no international Superfund to which appeal can be made, should 
common-law judicial actions against Texaco, FreeportMacMoRan, Dow Chemical, 
Cape or the Southern Peru Copper Corporation fail.  
 
After listing a number of cases in the United States in which indemnities have been 
paid by corporations, such as the Exxon Valdez, a Venezuelan journalist  asked 
himself in January 2000: “Being Venezuela a country dominated by the oil and 
mining industries, the question is, which is the pasivo ambiental (i.e. environmental 
liability) of all this oil and mining activity in our country?”15 It is fascinating to watch 
the diffusion of the term pasivo ambiental in a mining and oil extraction context in 
Latin America as one writes this article. Hector Sejenovich, from Buenos Aires, was 
perhaps the first economist to use this term when he calculated the environmental 
liabilities from oil extraction in the province of Neuquen, Argentina. The Argentinian 
Minister for the Environment Oscar Massei was quoted on 6 February 200 ( journal 
Rio Negro, on line) as saying that regional incentives to oil companies in Neuquen 
may not include flexibilization of environmental standards. The government, he added 
ominously, had in its possession the study made for UNDP which evaluated the 
pasivos ambientales from oil exploitation in Neuquen at one billion dollars. In Peru, a 
new law project was submitted to Congress in 1999 (project n. 786) creating an 
National Environmental Fund - as sort of internal GEF as a congressman put it. The 
Fund would finance environmental research, it would improve and restore the 
environment, and would promote ecological agriculture. Its economic resources would 
come mainly from a percentage of the revenue from the privatization of state 
enterprises. After complaining about the environmental deterioration in the last 
decades because of mining and fisheries, after commenting on increasing 
desertification and deforestation in the country, congressman Alfonso Cerrate quoted 
the case of the privatization of CENTROMIN (the State firm which was the successor 
to the Cerro de Pasco Copper Corporation), which was not successful. The 
environmental problems of Centromin must have been a factor in the lack of buyers at 
the auction. The question was, “who will pay for the ecological debt? Who will 
assume the environmental liability (pasivo ambiental) accumulated throughout the 
years by CENTROMIN and other state firms?” 
 
In Chile, new legislation on liabilities after closing mines was being discussed in 1999 
and 2000. The Sociedad Nacional de Mineria was aware that environmental standards 
should improve, that there was a danger of being internationally accused of ecological 
dumping, and it was in favor of applying international environmental standards 
adapted of course to national realities. En el tema del pasivo ambiental, it added, 
discussions were proceeding but the general feeling in the industry was that the State 
should assume such environmental liabilities.16 The Bolivian vice-minister of Mines, 
Adan Zamora, referring to the pollution in the river Pilcomayo (that flows down from 
Potosi towards Tarija and eventually Argentina), increased by the bursting of a 
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tailings dyke at Porco belonging to Comsur, had said in 1998: la nueva politica estatal 
minero-metalurgica tiene como responsabilidad remediar los pasivos ambientales 
originados en la actividad minera del pasado (Presencia, 16 June 1998). In fact, 
environmental liabilities in Potosi reach back to the 16th century. 
 
[A]CONCLUSIONS 
 
Driven by consumption, the throughput of energy and materials in the world economy 
has never been so large as today. Paradoxically, increases in eco-efficiency lead 
sometimes to increased demands of material and energy, because their costs diminish 
(the Jevons effect). Externalities will not decrease but on the contrary, increase 
because the growth of the world economy. We are certainly not in a “post-material” 
age. Externalities (i.e. cost-shifting) must be seen as part and parcel of the economy, 
which is necessarily open to the entry of resources and to the exit of residues. The 
appropriation of resources and the production of waste result in ecological distribution 
conflicts, which give rise to a worldwide Environmental Justice movement which in 
fact started many years ago. The Environmentalism of the Poor and the movement for 
Environmental Justice (local and global), grown from the complaints against the 
appropriation of communal environmental resources and against the disproportionate 
burdens of pollution, may help to move society and economy in the direction of 
ecological sustainability. 
 
Activists of the U.S. Environmental Justice movement have emphasized the links 
between the increasing globalization of the economy and environmental degradation 
of habitats for many of the world’s peoples: “In many places where Black, minority, 
poor or Indigenous peoples live, oil, timber and minerals are extracted in such a way 
as to devastate eco-systems and destroy their culture and livelihood. Waste from both 
high- and low-tech industries, much of it toxic, has polluted groundwater, soil and the 
atmosphere. Environmental degradation such as this, and its concomitant impact on 
human wealth and welfare, is increasingly seen as violation of human rights”. As 
mining, logging, oil drilling and waste-disposal projects push into further corners of 
the planet, people all over the world are seeing their basic rights compromised, losing 
their livelihoods, cultures and even their lives. “Environmental devastation globally 
and what we call “environmental racism” in the United States, are violations of human 
rights and they occur for similar reasons”.17  
 
The management and resolution of such ecological distribution conflicts requires 
cooperation between business, international organizations, NGO networks, local 
groups, governments. Can this cooperation be based on common values and on 
common languages? We argue that this is not always the case, that whenever there are 
unresolved ecological conflicts, there is likely to be not only a discrepancy but 
incommensurability in valuation (Faucheux and O’Connor, 1998, Funtowicz and 
Ravetz, 1994, Martinez-Alier, Munda and O’Neill, 1998, 1999, Martinez-Alier and 
O’Connor, 1996, 1999, O’Connor and Spash, 1999).  Environmental conflicts are 
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expressed as conflicts on valuation, either inside one single standard of valuation, or 
across plural values. In other words, “semiotic resistance” (O’Connor, 1993; Escobar, 
1996:61) to environmental abuse may be expressed in many languages. To see in 
statements about human rights, indigenous rights, sacredness, culture, livelihood, a 
lack of understanding or an a priori refusal of the techniques of economic valuation in 
actual or fictitious markets, indicates a failure to grasp the existence of value 
pluralism. Different interests can be defended either by insisting on the discrepancies 
of valuation inside the same standard of value, or by resorting to non-equivalent 
descriptions of reality, i.e. to different value standards. 
 
Should legislation require dispersed minerals to be concentrated again to their 
previous state and the dispersed overburden to be restored, this would indeed change 
the pattern of prices in the economy. Beyond economic values, choices on the use of 
“natural capital” involve decisions about which interests and forms of life will be 
sustained, which will be sacrificed or abandoned. A common language of valuation is 
not available for such decisions. For instance, it can be stated that while humans have 
different economic values they all have the same value in the scale of human dignity. 
When we say that someone or something is “very valuable” or “not very valuable”, 
this is an elliptical statement (which requires the further question, in which standard of 
valuation? (O’Neill, 1993). For policy, what is needed is not cost-benefit analysis but 
rather a non-compensatory multi-criteria approach able to accommodate a plurality of 
incommensurable values (Munda, 1995, Martinez-Alier, Munda and O’Neill, 1998, 
1999).  
 
While conventional economics looks at environmental impacts in terms of 
externalities which should be internalized into the price system, one can see 
externalities (following Kapp) not as market failures but as cost-shifting successes 
which nevertheless might give rise to environmental movements (Leff. 
1986,O’Connor, 1988). Such movements will legitimately employ a variety of 
vocabularies and strategies of resistance, and they cannot be gagged by cost-benefit 
analysis or by the cost-effectiveness approach. In conclusion, conflicts on the access 
to natural resources or on the exposure to environmental burdens and risks, may be 
expressed: 
 
 
: Inside one single standard of valuation. How should the externalities caused by a 
firm be valued in money terms, when demanding compensation in a court case? How 
could an argument for conservation of a natural space be made or contested, in terms 
of the number and biological value of the species it contains, or in terms of its net 
primary production? An appeal to the particular experts is here appropriate. 
 
: Through a value standard contest or dispute, that is a class in the standards of value 
to be applied, as when losses of biodiversity, or in cultural patrimony, or damage to 
human livelihoods, or infringements on human rights, are compared in non-
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commensurable terms to economic gains from a new dam or from a mining project or 
from oil extraction. There is a clash in standards of valuation when the languages of 
environmental justice, or indigenous territorial rights, or environmental security, are 
deployed against monetary valuation of environmental risks and burdens. Non-
compensatory multi-criteria decision aids or participatory methods of conflict 
resolution are more appropriate for this second, common type of situation, than the 
mere appeal to the disciplinary experts. (O’Connor and Spash, 1999:5). 
 
 
Thus, ecological distribution conflicts are sometimes expressed as discrepancies of 
valuation inside one single standard of value (as when there is a disputed claim for 
monetary compensation for an environmental liability), but they often lead to multi-
criteria disputes (or dialogues) which rest on different standards of valuation. Which is 
“the price of oil”?- asked Human Rights Watch in a report on the Niger Delta. Todo 
necio/ confunde valor y precio - agreed long ago Antonio Machado. 
 
ENDNOTES 
 
1 Butte has been known as the “richest hill on Earth” in Montana local lore and 
history, an honor which belongs not to Butte’s copper but to Potosi’s Cerro Rico’s 
silver. Butte recently “has earned the more dubious distinction of being the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s geographically largest “Superfund” cleanup site, 
a legacy of mining history” (Finn, 1998: 250, fn. 8). Butte used to belong to the 
Anaconda Company, which bought from Guggenheim the Chuquicamata mine in 
Chile, possibly the largest copper mine on earth. No Superfund for Chuquicamata, nor 
for Potosi. 
2 Ferrero (1993:214) lists the articles of the Criminal Code which were infringed. 
There were no judicial pursuits in Spain or in Britain. 
3 Skeptics also point out correctly that in Aznalcollar, a village inside the polluted area 
of 1888, the miners of Bolliden clamored in 1999 for “their” mine to reopen, against 
middle-class environmentalists from Seville and Madrid. Bolliden is a Swedish-
Canadian company whose tailings dike broke down in 1998 contaminating with heavy 
metals ten thousand hectares of irrigated agriculture (where cultivation has been 
discontinued), and threatening the Doñana national park in the delta of the 
Guadalquivir.  
4 Accion Ecologica (Quito) and Observatorio Latinoamericano de Conflictos 
Ambientales (Santiago de Chile), A los mineros: ni un paso atras en Junin-Intag, 
Quito, 1999. (On the wayno music, p.66). 
5 Much of the documentation on this case comes from the files from the Permanent 
People’s Tribunal on Global Corporations and Human Wrongs organized by the Lelio 
Basso Foundation at the School of Law, University of Warwick, Coventry, 22-25 
March 2000. See also Eyal Press, “Freeport-McMoRan at Home and Abroad”, The 
Nation, July 31-August 7, 1995, and Robert Bryce (from the newspaper Austin 
Chronicle), “Spinning Gold”, Mother Jones, Sept.- Oct. 1996.. 
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6 Mining Journal (London), vol. 329, n. 8448, 26 Sept. 1997. 
7 Survival for Tribal Peoples (London), Media Briefing May 1998, “Rio Tinto critic 
gagged”. 
8 I would myself frame the issue in terms of incommensurableness of values rather 
than  the value being larger or smaller. 
9 The Economist, 12 July 1997, p. 30. El Universal (Caracas), 3 August 1997, p. 1-12. 
10 “Horinkhola and the surrounding villages have been declared a “Shrimp-Free 
Zone”, and every November 7, thousands of landless peasants gather here in a show 
of solidarity with this community’s resistance against the shrimp industry” (Ahmed, 
1997:15). 
11 R. Bullard, Directory. People of Color Environmental Groups 1994-1995, 
Environmental Justice Resource Center, Clark Atlanta University, Georgia. My 
underlining. 
12 Available at www.saep.org, letter from Norton Tennille and Boyce W. Papu to 
Peter Mandelson, 7 September 1998. 
13 Ronnie Morris, “UK court demolishes double standards”, Business Report, 4 March 
1999, and subsequent information downloaded from www.saep.org. A UN report 
stated in 1990 that the Rossing uranium mine in Namibia was “a theft under the law 
and must be accounted for when Namibia becomes independent”. 
14 Internal World Bank memo, as reported in The Economist, 8 February 1992, under 
the title “Let them eat pollution”. This has become a favorite text for the 
Environmental Justice movement. 
15 Orlando Ochoa Teran, Quinto Dia, 18 January 2000, relayed by J.C.Centeno 
through the Environment in Latin America discussion list (ELAN at CSF). Some of us 
have been struggling for years to introduce the equivalent expression deuda ecologica. 
16 Danilo Torres Ferrari, Los avances de la normativa sobre Cierre de Faenas Mineras, 
Boletin Minero (Chile), 1122, June 1999. 
17 Deborah Robinson, International Possibilities Unlimited, Washington DC, 
“Environmental Devastation and Home & Abroad: The Importance of Understanding 
the Link”, 1999, www.preamble.org/environmental_justice 
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